Economic and Financial Review
Volume 33

Number 4

Article 10

12-1-1995

Central bank autonomy: historical and general perspective.
S. B. Falegan

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/efr

Recommended Citation
Falegan, S. B. (1995). Central bank autonomy: historical and general perspective. Economic and Financial
Review, 33(4), 416-428.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economic and Financial Review by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact dc@cbn.gov.ng.

C BN

ECO NOMIC

&

FIN ANCIAL

REV IEW,

VOL.

33,

NO.

4:

41 6-428

Central Bank Autonomy: Historical and General Perspective
by

Chief S. B. Falegan, FC/B*
As a "fresher" in the Central Bank of Nigeria in July 196 1 when I started work, the first
assignment given to me was twofold:
(a) To critically examine the Central Bank of Nigeria's functions under the Bank's Act of
1958 which set it up; and

(b) To examine comparable functions of Central Banks elsewhere and the relationship
between them and their Governments.
The issue of Central Bank autonomy is as old as Central Banking. This seminar further
reinforces the view that the debate is a continuous one, particularly in the present circumstance of
the Central Bank of Nigeria's history.
Central bank autonomy is often discussed in the context of the functions it performs. Some of
the functions are statutory, non-statutory and developmental. Usually such functions include
serving as fiscal agent to the government, lender of last resort for private financial institutions
during emergencies, and a regulator and supervisor of the financial system. As the principal public
sector agency charged with the execution of a country's monetary policy, however, the Bank can
encounter a number of conflicting objectives. It must weigh long range economic growth against
control of inflation and external balance. It is almost always under economic and political pressure
to emphasize some goals at the expense of others in the formulation and conduct of monetary
policy. The extent to which the Central Bank accommodates this pressure can depend greatly on its
institutional independence.
Independence of a central bank has always been discussed in the context of autonomy from
governments. This is because there has always been some relationship between governments and
central banks. Governments set in motion the setting up of central banks. Central banks are
crea ted by legislation and they derive their powers from such legislation. The government relies on
the central bank to perform certain specialized functions on its behalf and provide certain services
for the government. In such a situation, central banks cannot be completely separated from their
countries government.
In our comparative study of central bank independence, congnisance must be taken of the
hist ory and the ever-c hanging policy environment arising from changi n g or
c halle ng ing economic developments. In the developed countries, the policy concern of
some countries at a given point in time is price stability. To achieve such, monetary policy
is the canon to curb money supply from growing wild; fiscal policy must be such as not to
underm.ine monetary policy. There is the school of thought which feels that monetary policy is an
important economic policy instrument which should not be left out of the government. Although
•
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cc111ral banks are mostly charged with the execution of monetruy policy in most developed
economics they do not show much independence in the determination of monetary policy. They are
usually subordinate to the Treasury/Finance Ministry in the formulation of policy. and some scope
for di-.agreement with the government exists.
At the inception of the Bank of England. the issue of independence of the Bank was first raised
by David Richard in 1824. lo spite of bis view. British monetary policy is subject to the direction of
the U.K. Treasury, and Parliament generaJly holds the government respoDStl>le for the actions of the
Bank of England. In Japan, Finance Ministqr dominates. Both the Finance Ministry and the
Economic Planning Agency in Japan are represented on the Policy Board of the CcntraJ Bank. and
this board's annuaJ report to the Japanese Diet must be submitted through the Finance Ministry.
French and Italian monetary policies are also dictated by the Treasury. even on a very short-term
basis. In C.anada, the CentraJ Bank bad more formal authority before 1967 when an amendment to
the Bank of Canada Act gave the Minister of Finance the power to issue directives to the Bank.
This generaJ pattern of subordination to the Treasury extends to most of the world's other developed
countries as well. The CcntraJ Bank of Germany ~'J)Crienced substantial independence in postwar
years. The restructuring of the Deutsche Bundesbank in 1957 actually increased the influence of
the FederaJ Government but still left the Central Bank one of the most independent in the world.
Government authorities can attend meetings of the bank's highest deliberative body. the Central
Bank Council. They have no vote but only ~ power to delay a decision for a maximum of two
weeks. Although the Bundesbank is charged with supporting generaJ economic policy, this is
subordinate to its responsibility for safeguarding the value of the currency. The government itself is
responsible for fiscal policy, and the CentraJ Bank deals with mooetruy policy. While the government is responstl>le for decisions about the exchange rate regime, subject in practice to CentraJ
Bank approval, the Buodesbank is responsible for discretiopary foreign exchange intervention
policy. This division bas allowed some conflict in the past, but it bas not been prolonged. The
Bundesbank is not formally answerable to the parliament. except for submission of~ anouaJ report.
In Swiu_.erland, the Swiss National Bank and the government must consult with each other
on policy matters, but approval before implementation by the other party is not necessary. The
Bank: is constitutionally independent of the parliamentruy body bul as in the German case. submits
an annuaJ report. Unlike Germany, the Swiss confederation owns no shares in its Central Bank:.
Stock is held by the canton. cantonal banks, and the public. Shares are listed on the Swiss stock
Exchange. The policy of the Swiss National Bank is made indirectly by the Council. which consists
of 40 members, 25 of whom are appointed by the government cabinet for four-year terms. The
remaining 15 are elected by bank stockholders. The cooncil selects a smaller board that directly
manages monetary policy. The role of the gmiemment in the bank is explicitly limited by law to
such matters as determining the size of the bank's capital, the denomination of bank notes. and the
division of profits among cantons. Formal government participation in mooetruy policy is quite
minor.
The U.S. Federal Reserve System is also independent when judged against most other central banks. But the Federal Reserve bas a fonnal responstl>ility to the legislatiYe branch of the
government that is greater than in Germany and Switzerland. It must report ~ testimony to the
Congress twice yearly on the conduct of monetary policy. and it submits an aonuaJ report. The
Chairman and the six other members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are
frequently caJJed on to testify before Congress on monetuy policy and various other subjects.
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Over the years the arguments for more independence were gaining more and more followers.
An outstanding example is the formulation in the Treaty ofMaastricht, which defines the statute of
a future European Central Bank System (ECBS). This system consists of the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks which have to be independent when the system starts
at the beginning of the final stage III in 1997, 1999 or later. "Independence" means that the
decision-making body, the Council of the ECB, does not depend on orders from national
governments and supernational institutions. It is even not allowed to ask for government guidance.
As a consequence of this prescription a number of West-European Governments have given
independence to their own Central Banks even now. This is true for France, Spain, and more or less
for Italy and Belgium. In Germany and in the Netherlands independence existed for a long time.
The U.K. is finding great difficulties in the whole matter. Therefore the Treaty of Maastricht gives
the U.K. the right of opting out of the European Monetary Union.
In Australia, while the Bank operates within the set objectives of Government, its
independence within or inside the government is maintained by the armory of instruments to
operate freely. In effect, while there is political independence within the government, it has the
economic independence whereby its ability to freely determine the manner in which it implements
policy objectives is guaranteed: that is. it has or experiences instrument implementation
independence. As a guarantee of mutual respect, the legislation provides that in event of dispute
over monetary policy, the government can override the reserve Bank by tabling its objections before
both houses of parliament. In practice. such a situation has not arisen.
In the case of developing rnuntries, the laws governing the setting up and the functioning of
central banks have generall) followed the pattern of the colonial power. Changes are often made in
the light of developments and their economic environment. In the case of the Franco-phone com1tries, with common currenc~. there is, no independence of central banks from France,
especially in monetary, foreign trade and exchange rate policies, The only exceptions were Guinea
and Mali, in the 1960s and l lJ7lls which found themselves compelled to return to the Franco-phone
fold.
In the English-speaking countries, not only did each establish its national currency a r
independence, each also pursued indepe ndent economic policies with central banks seen as
sufficiently strategic and at the core for promoting rapid economic growth. At independence. most
central banks were established as independent organs within the government, and not necessarily
of government. However, the growing and rapid changes in economic environment led to drastic
changes in the laws establishing central banks. In South Korea, the amendments to the Bank of
Korea Act in 1962 transferred monetary policy power to a Monetary Council of the Government,
including foreign exchange policy formulations. The immediate takeover of such functions by the
government was followed by a financial refonn that induded the establishment of special banks
according to their distinct financial features. At the other extreme is the case of Uganda during the
!di-Amin regime. It did not require the government to amend the laws establishing ilie Bank of
Uganda to undermine ant.I remo,·e its independence. It merely took over the Bank and forced it to
take unorthodox methods to finance government's weird fiscal deficits. This is equally true of
Zaire. In the case of Uganda. the attempt by the Governor of the Bank at that time to assert his
authoi-ity and independence led not only to his being dismissed, but his body found floating on one
of the lakes a few days latter.
h1 Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria has had a chequred history in terms of exercising
authority and independence. It has moved from the sublime and descended to ilie mundane, and no
one knows where it will end taking current events into account.
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The Central Bank of Nigeria has the following statutory functions as spelt out in the Bank's
original Act of 1958, Section 4:
(l)

To issue legal tender currency in Nigeria;

(2)

To maintain external reserves in order to safeguard the international value of the
currency;

(3)

To promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure in Nigeria; aAd

(4)

To act as banker and financial adviser to the Federal Government. The Act has sunt
undergone 14 amendments culminating in Decree No. 24 of 1991 and Decree No. 2-' of ·
1991.

The authority for managing and administering the affairs and business of the Bank
rests·with the Board of Directors, with the Governor as the head.
The Board lays down the broad outlines of policy on:
(a)

Monetary and credit formulation and execution;

(b)

Fixation of the rate or rates of discount or rediscounts and the rate or interest on
advances to the Government and to other customers of the Bank;

(c)

Determination of the rate of exchange at which the Bank buys and sells foreign
currencies.

(d)

Establishment and closure of banks' branches;

(e)

Appointment of currency agents, auditors and officials and other employees. ·

For the purpose of achieving these objectives, especially the much broader function of
maintaining monetary stability, an array of tools is available to the Bank for monetary control:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

(g)
(h)

Variable discount rate; interest rate structure and bank charges.
Open market operation.
Variable liquid assets and liquidity ratio.
Moral suasion.
Selective credit control.
Cash reserve requirement.
Special deposits.
Stabilization securities.

When the Central Bank of Nigeria Act was amended in 1968, a number of additional
instruments of monetary control were given to the bank. These include the power:
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(a)

To prescnbed minimum ratio of total loans and advances and discounts which each
commercial bank shall grant to indigenous pen;ons;

(b)

To prescnl>e cash reserve ratios from time to time for deposit liabilities which the banks
should maintain at the Central Banlc;

(c)

To call for special deposits from commercial banks;

(d)

To impose credit ceilings;

(e)

To vary the composition of specified liquid assets to be held in stipulated ratio to deposit
liabilities;

(f)

To approve commercial bank loam of certain s ~

(g)

To mue, allocate to and repurchase from financial institutions stabiliz.ation securities.

Decree No. 24 and Decree No. 25 of 1991 provided additional functions, which, as will be examined later provided for the Bank's Archilee's heel. Some of these instruments which amounted to
command control and rigid credit system of the economy have fallen into disuse as a result of the
deregulation and open market policy of the Structural Adjustment Programme.
At the same time some, like the stabilization securities, are being over used at the expense of
other suitable and relevant instruments such as open marlcet operations that commenced on June 30
l 993 through the establishment of three Discount Houses. If it is true that Treaswy bill sold out of
Central Bank poltfolio are always over-subscribed, I am still puzzled why the same CBN embarlcs
on unmitigated use of stabiliz.ation securities. if indeed it is operating unfettered.

Central Bank - Governmmt Monetary Policy - Maki.Di Relationships
The relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Nigeria
took a new tum when the Central Bank Act was amended in l 968 with the following
provisions:
I.

The Board shall keep the Minister informed of the monetary and the banking policy
pursued or intended to be pursued by the Central Barut.

2.

The Minister shall, from time to time, if he disagrees with the Board on the monetary
and banking policy pursued, so inform the Board of his disagreement thereto, and the
Minister may submit his representation and that of the Central Banlc to the Federal
Executive Council.

3.

The Federal Executive Council may, in writing after considering the representation,
direct the Central Bank as to the monetary and banking policy pursued or intended to be
pursued and the directive shall be binding on the Board which shall forthwith take all
nea:ssary step or expedient to give effect thereto.
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Thus. the discretionary power of the Central Bank on matters relating to the formulation of
monetary policy became a joint responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Hitherto
responsibility for the formulation of monetary wlicy rested primarily with the.Board ofDirectors of
the Central Bank in close consultation with the government
The Financial System Review Committre set up in April 1976 examined, among other things,
the implication of this aspect of the Central Bank (Amendment Act of 1968). The Committre
recommended an amendment of Section 3 (2) of the Act to have the word 'may' changed and
substitute 'shall' in its place so that the amendment will read 'shall' submit his representation and
the representation of the Central Bank without any abridgment to the Federal Executive council
(now to read President-in-Council).
Since the Government failed to accept the amendment. it is obvious that the Central Bank
creates and initiates new policy instruments. but the Ministiy of Finance uerwa and controls
policy. One of the immediate effects of this change in the status of the Central Bank is that the level
of authority and precedence of Govcrnor-Miaister relationship became the Governor-permanent
Secretary relationship. The Governor has no more direct~ to the Minister as to the evolution
and the style in the change in status. One important point however, is that the io)age, effectiveness,
professionalism, proficiency and character of an incumbent is a strong determining factor in the
working relation between the two authorities. In a managed economy, it may be too much to expect
the Governor of the Bank to have a decisive influence on Government's will. The control or exercise of monetary policy power by a Government Ministiy is therefore, not peculiar to Nigeria.
But in our case, how was this authority usqfl One can with some measure of judgement as an
insider say that the golden era of Central Bank authority ended with the civil war. There is nothing
particularly wrong in the Treasury exercising control over the Central Bank once the human
resources and ability to perform the functions and shoulder responsibility are asmred. There were
those in the Treaswy who were more keen on exercising authority over individuals as evidence of
the newly acquired power than in mastering the responsibilities that the new power entails in terms
of policy formulation and mastery. They now see the Central Bank as one of the parastatals
under them whose top officials are summoned to meetings at command and questioned for coming
late to meetings. Purely fiscal policy issues for which a Treaswy man should proudly command
respect in terms ofunderstanding policy formulation implications are easily passed to Central Bank
of Nigeria for action. There are occasions when the l'ennanent Secreta,y sees himself more
powerful and important than the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria Two instances will
suffice here. On one occasion. a paper on "Management of Nigeria's External Reserves," was to be
presented for public enlightenment by the Director of Research of the Bank.. Two days before the
presentation, the then Permanent Secretary, Ministry ofFinance, wrote a letter to the then Governor
of the Central Bank of Nigeria directing that the public lecture be stopped Thank goodness,
the Governor, a man of straw, turned down the request and the lecture was given. That
information-gap-bridging opened the eyes of intellectuals and the public to another
perception of the Central Bank and that has.given the Research Department of the Bank an
image of human resource centre till today.
The other is what to me amounts to arrogance of power. Under the World/IMF rules or conventions at their annual meetings, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank of
Nigeria are Governors of the World Bank and IMF, ~ e J y. As an evidence of exercising
power, the Permanent Secretary of Finance in 1980 or so removal the Governor of Central Bank of
Nigeria's name as the IMF Governor and substituted his name instead When a Permanent
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Secretary went to that length, it shows lack of respect not only to the Governor of the Central Bank
but also to his Minister of Finance who in fact did not do anything to rectify the insult meted lo the
Central Bank Governor. The has.sle it generated left a gap of responsible performance on all sides.
To me it was a period of dishonour among policy makers, I must confess the incident hastened my
exit from the Bank.
At one time, the Bank was stifled of initiative and innovation and confined to the routine
functions of exchange control administration, opening letters of credit for pubHc bodies, and
humdrum credit control operations for which the Bank was better known. Criticisms such as
delays of Central Banlc in releasing foreign exchange often gave the wrong impression that
exchange control was the main, if not the sole responsibility that the Bank exercised. The other
danger was that what should be a day-to day monitoring of monetary tools and operations (for
example interest rate changes) was turned, unfortunately, into an annual budgetary affair, thus
glossing over prompt remedies to emerging problems arising therefrom.
lnfact, the credit control which the Central Bank has reHed upon and used most excessively
can operationally be described more as a direct control measure dictated by Goveryunent than a
measure exercised by the Central Bank. Whether or not the Central Bank should be completely
independent of Government, parucularly of the Federal Ministry of Finance, is not an issue of too
great significance. What is important are the coasequences of the various amendments to the
Central Bank of Nigeria Act, most especially the fact that:
(a)

Over the years since its inception, the Bank has lost most of its independent powers
which have been vested in it, to the Federal Ministry of Finance;

(b)

Since the Bank has Httle or no discretion in formulating and executing monetary poHcy,
Government fiscal policies (especially expenditure policies) override monetary policy;
and

(c)

The ability of the Bank to set the course as well as a stance of monetary policy at its
discretion has been severely restricted by Govemmenl's excessive spending. This
limitation is reflected in the Bank's little success, if any, al controlling the inflation
arising from expansion of monetary aggregates.

The Central Bank of Nigeria Under the President
What I have described so far was a child's play with subsequent developments. Under Decree
24 of 1991, the Central Bank got its "freedom" (mark my emphasis on "freedom" rather than
independence) from the Ministry of Finance and found itself buried in the belly of the tiger-the
presidency with responsibility for performing monetary and banking functions staled as follows
under articles 8 , l & 2 : (1) The Government shall keep the President informed of the
monetary and banking policy pursued by the Bank. (2) The President after due consideration may
in writing, direct the Bank as to the monetary and banking policy pursued or intended to be pursued
and the directive shall be binding on the Board which shall forthwith take aJI steps necessary or
expedient to give effect thereto.
Note that under Decree No. 17, Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) of 1968, the Minister
and the Federal Executive Council were involved in monetary and banking policy. lo the 1991
Decree, the President (not even the Presidency or President-in-Council) was substituted for the
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Minister and the Federal Executive Council to formulate, determine, and execute monetary
and banking policy for which "forthwith" the Central Bank was compelled to "take all steps
necessary to expedite action to give effect to the President's directive," no matter the level of the
Central Bank of Nigeria's disagreement with such policy. The consequence is our inability t?.
exP,lain how $12.2 billion was used between the President and the Chief Executive of the Bank,
issue that has dented the image of the Bank. If what was credited to former President Ibrahim
Babangida in Tell Magazine is true about the unaccounted for-N412.2 billion, then the Central
Bank of Nigeria has been cheated out of its responsibilities. It is to the effect that once you run a
government, you don't put money in the bank. Government is about development and
development is about spending money. The far-reaching economic consequence of such cynicism
of a president to his citizenry is obvious today a~ per capita income has dropped below poverty line,
and what we are now having is development by destruction. If the president of a country can say
that and get away with it, what his statement has shown is that government is no more the art of
governance but a gambling den of trading outpost or a market for business enterprise for the favoured
where the rules of the game are no more relevant and therefore, there is no more ceteris paribus
(all things being equal), as economists are fond of assuming. What in effect he is saying is that all
policy formulations and conceptions whether budgetaiy, fiscal or monetary are irrelevant and therefore, the institutions concerned, especially the Central Bank, are redundant. In that case, the Central Bank is being made to become a mere clearing house, a trading and transactions outpost having
only a say and not its way, barking without ability to bite.
I have mentioned earlier that there is nothing unusual in the proper collaboration and mutual
respect between a supervisory ministry like the Federal Ministry of Finance that is responsible or is
at the core of government fiscal if not total econom,ic policy, and the Central Bank of Nigeria whose
statutory role it should guard jealously without hindrance. The Bank of England is directly under
the Treasury but we have never heard the Secretary of Treasury subjecting the Governor to indignity
or opprobrium, bully and threats as is common here and in many developing countries. It is mutual
respect; and where there is disagreement, it will be over policy and not on personality, and their
duty is first to the nation and the overall interest of the country.
For example, Balewa during his regime made a categorical statement that though the
Central Bank of Nigeria is not independent of the Government, it is independent within the
Government, and that was how it operated. That is why from the founding fathers of the Bank
under Roy Fantan, Mai Bornu and to a lesser extent lUlder Dr. Isong as Governors, there was
mutual respect between them and their respective ministers under Chief Festus Okotie Eboh, and
Chief Obafemi Awolowo; all working closely and withotlt hindrance, and their permanent
secretaries were loyal and were not usurping other people's functions.
There is an irony in the leadership role the Central Bank of Nigeria is giving in economic and
financial matters. At one breadth those who are mentally lazy to perform their statutory functions
find the Central Bank a fertile ground to shift their statutory functions and have them performed for
them because the Central Bank continues to provide professional and competent leadership for
policy formulation. The apparent transparent and competent performance of these functions is
making the Central Bank a dumping ground for all sorts of unsolicited functions that detract from
its prime and statutory functions. Under the new dispensation, all sorts of duties are put on the
Central Bank to perform and these have created a monster for it under which it is suffocating.
Meanwhile, of the five functions on which the Board is expected to lay down broad policy
guidelines, the Bank seems to have lost its discretionary powers in determining three most
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important functions listed earlier in this paper, while the last two which are operationally inevitable
are left for the Board to perform.
I have personally watched with apprehension the phenomenal and unparalleled increase in
unsolicited, non-statutory, developmental and financial functions the bank has been made to take
on in the last couple of years, the totality of which has relegated the statutory functions of the Bank
to secondary position. Not only is the Bank made to perform such functions, it is also expected to
provide and execute the regulatory and supervisory instruments. The anomalous situation is to find
the Bank competing in some areas with institutions it is supposed to regulate; that is the banking
system, while its core function on which its authority, autonomy, impartial role, and prestige rest is
performed or usurped by the Presidency and other super-and-supra-hidden bodies that press the
button behind the scene. It does not even matter to those concerned whether the Central Bank has
the well-equipped staff to take on these imposed duties. The result is the overstretching of the staff
of the Bank into very many functions. The consequence is that even when someone else should be
held responsible for obvious lapse in functional responsibility, the Central Bank becomes the
victim, as if the Central Bank is the Government of Nigeria Have these extraordinary functions
not undermined and eroded confidence in its impartiality and independent judgement? I am often
amazed at the pace of attack on the Central Bank by the operators of the financial markets. If the
merchant and commercial banks don't attack the Bank for not providing adequate supply of foreign
exchange to the market, it is the Stock Exchange and/or SEC and NDIC feeling uncomfortable that
the bank is eroding their functions. I am often puzzled at the accusation that the Bank does not
provide enough foreign exchange to the market as if it manufactures foreign exchange. Can we
guarantee any independent action of the Bank in foreign exchange operations where what constitutes official transactions can not be independently determined by the Bank?
It should be emphasized that since the inception ofthe Central Bank in I 958, it has never been
insulated from the frequent changes in Government. It has had the opportunity to operate briefly
under two civilian administration, while it has consistently operated for 30 years under military
rule with every regime manipulating it to meet its set objectives. No matter how elegantly couched
and spelt out the language of independence and functions of the Central Bank can be, the military
regime can not capture the changing policy making envirooment and set objectives for which it is
not schooled (in the art of governance}, and therefore, can not appreciate the damage being
done to the economy by merely printing and spending money for worthy and unworthy causes
without restraint. Such regimes are not averse to inflation and hyper-inflation. There are also
those who benefit from government-induced inflation who don't care about any policy as long as
they are the beneficiaries.
Even when these statutory functions are strictly followed and conscientiously executed by the
monetary authority, changes in economic and financial circumstances, more-than-extraneous factors, are making those statutory functions themselves no more adequate unless adjusted to meet the
changing environment. For example, time was when the major, if not the only determining factor
of exchange rate changes was the international flow of goods. It was then easy to operate a fixed
exchange rate determination and movement under the IMF up till the mid 1970s. However, with
the explosive growth in financial markets both at the international and domestic markets, operations in the financial markets have increasingly become decisive in exchange rate movements
globally, thus displacing the international flow ofgoods. The factors behind exchange rate fluctuation become less visible, transparent and tangible but more severe than when such rates were
based on flow of goods. No central bank could thereby independently operate or determine its
exchange rate in isolation from the rest oftlie world Exchange rate determination has thus become
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a global function with some key currencies playing the role of reserve and intervention currencies,
while the rest use those currencies to determine their own rates. In our own case, the black market
rates seem to give the lead in dictating the official exchange rate.
What we have said about the Central Bank of Nigeria under the president brings into focus a
serious issue about the integrity and accountability of the Bank. In effect, if
a central bank can be misused and made to function unprofessionally by a President, to
whom is it accountable? The almost incessant attacks on the Central Bank from all sides
of the country's financial system often worry me. It must be admitted that we have all contributed
to the problems. The operators are manipulators, and the Bank proved to be an innocent
confusionist. Prudential supervision of the country's banking system was only recently
enforced as a formal core function of the Ban.}( arising from the unrestricted establishment
of commercial, merchant, mortgage, People's, community banks and other non-bank
finance houses. While the law for establishing some of the institutions are vested in the Cenlral
Bank, and advice has been given by the Bank against granting licences to some banks,
pressures have been made to bear, and indeed, such powers exercised outside the Central
Bank to grant such licences. When many of them are running into problems, the Central
Bank is always the focus to be called upon to find solution to them and enforce prudential
supervision which, at times, turns out to be action worse than inactivity or applying medicine
after death. It does not even matter to those who create the problems in the first instance
whether the Bank is overstretched or not or have th e human capacity to perform such
unsolicited functions. Even where the Central Bank succeeds in enforcing such supervision,
more than political pressures are made to bear on the Bank to soft-pedal. In a situation
like that the Bank becomes ineffective, and unco-ordinated: protective of some untouchables and
more-than-severe on others. In such a situation, not only does it become a victim of attack from all
angles, its own sense of accountability and impartiality is called into question. What it genuinely
puts out in its half-yearly and yearly reports as economic performance are regarded either as
doctored to suit the government or taken as unreliable. A willing President that has manipulated
the Bank cares less about data on trends in economic perfonnance, budgetary performance, staff
quality and availability and utilization of financial resources entrusted to the Bank. etc. Once the
Bank also feels it is protected by the President, it unconsciously exposes itself to limitless and lessthan-candid financial probity and control. In such a case, a central bank which stresses only its
independence and ignores its ultimate accountability to the body politic may find itself being kicked
about like a football. It would have succeeded in giving away and losing touch with its ultimate
mission of serving the public at large. I personally feel sad to read in the 1995 budget that tl1e
Central Bank of Nigeria was one of the parastatals that was directed to submit its budget for scrunity
in order to curb unmitigated budgetary spending by such parastatal.
At this juncture, I want to make bold to ask, as we are among ourselves, bow we feel about our
personal image and the image of the Bank as perceived by the:
the public;
the banking system;
the commerce and industry;
the trading public; and
the governrnent.
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Some of us must have a sense of fulfilment, while others, both within and without, will have a
searching conscience in saying that. I want to recall a book titled, A 100 Years of Central Banking
in USA, by Metzler and Brunner. The authors took pain to look at key staff of the Federal Reserve
Bank over the period and passed judgement on them as to the effectiveness of policy goals and
objectives under them. Some stood condemned, some stood vindicated. That is the verdict of
history after we would have left.
There is one area, that may sound self-seeking and that is the attitude of the Board and Management of the Bank to its staff, serving and retired. As said earlier, I am often puzzled at the
amount of responsibility being made to be performed by the Bank. Yet the velocity of circulation of
retired professional staff is increasing, even though they are well-equipped, alert and still capable of
serving. The excuse is the so-called retirement age policy of the government. Herein comes ambivalence of the Bank. At one breadth seeking independence from government, and at another
breadth, conveniently using government machinery, where suitable, to deny professionals of continuous service to the bank.
The second point is more than puzzling and that is the attitude of the Bank to the welfare of its
retired staff, especially in areas of pension and medical services. It is a matter of conscience, but let
me warn the professional staff of the Bank that they will one day find themselves outside the Bank,
and it is then they will know what it is to be on a monthly pension of less than NS,000 without
medical assistance. I have done a lot of ho'me work on this issue. It is painful to reveal that of all
government institutions and agencies, it is only the Central Bank that has this negative attitude to
its staff, bearing in mind that these are the founding fathers of the Bank. At this juncture, let me
make this scriptural injunction and appeal.

Go to the Ant, Thou Sluggard
Consider its ways, and be wise.

Conclusion
Finally, if what one is hearing from the grape vine is true to the effect that the Central Bank is
to be returned to the Federal Ministry ofFinance, a word of advice and a note of warning need to be
sounded. As shown earlier, there is nothing wrong in the Central Bank being under the Federal
Ministry of Finance provided the latter is not overbearing as it was from after civil war year up to
today. The relationship between the Minister and the Governor must be clear and mutually
respectable. Where there is dispute over monetary policy the government can override the Bank by
tabling the vtews of both the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Federal Ministry of Finance before
both houses of parliament where the final ,decision should reside. The Pem1anent Secretary will
continue to play his role as an official and not a boss of the Governor or any of his staff.
The reason for my position is this. Just as the Central Bank of Nigeria has statutory duty for
monetary policy, so does the Federal Ministry of Finance have responsibility for initiating and
executing fiscal policy. If there is one sore point in Nigeria's economic woe today that has rendered
all solutions to the economic problems impotent, it is the government's scandalous deficit financing
arising from fiscal indiscipline of the budgetary authorities headed by the Federal Ministry of
Finance. How then can the Ministry that renders the major monetary functions of the bank ineffective be called upon to exercise authority and control over the Bank?
One of the areas therefore, the image of the Bank can be enhanced is in financia l
discipline of the government. Unless the Central Bank is protected from the need to fund
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government induced and unmitigated budget deficits, price -stability whose achievement seems to
rest more in the hands of the budgetary authorities (under present circumstances) than in the
Central Bank will never be achieved. In short, sound monetary policy cannot be maintained
without a sound and disciplined fiscal system.
It does not credit the country to hold its Central Bank responsible for the self-inflicted,
profound and fundamental problems (with structural foundations that have a long history and are
now permanent and leprous) of our economy. But for a brief period of the Strucrnral
Adjustment Programme after which discipline was thrown overboard in our economic
management, exogenous and endogenous problems such as reckless and unmitigated deficit
financing, leading to rapid growth in excess liquidity, scandalously high and unstable interest rates,
induced exchange rate instability, leading to distressed financial institutions and erosion of the
value of financial resources have held sway. Unfortunately the bulk of these problems of
macro-economic instability are being largely tackled by monetary-management-induced policies
only which are normally central banking primary functions. When the Central Bank fails in
nipping in the bud the consequences of the induced excessive monetary expansion, market
depreciation of the naira exchange rate, a sustained weakening of external payments position,
and run-away inflation but gets the government to impose unrealistic and artificially dictated
interest rates and exchange rates, the Central Bank becomes the victim. The only instrument left in
its armory is the now hide-and seek stabilization securities that have added to compounding the
illiquidity of the banking and the economic system. A knowledgeable man once wrote that there is
nothing wrong to allow the bird to fly over your head. If the Central bank fails to shout publicly to
let people know the two deadly sources that generate excess liquidity which it wrongly attacks
through stabilization securities (the two are uncontroUed government deficit financing and the
ubiquitious but unacknowledged cocaine money-laundering). a wrong ~sessment will be made
about the role and place of the Central Bank and someone will shout for a wrong reason and say the
power of the Central Bank of Nigeria has increased; it is increasing and it ought to be diminished.
The Central Bank should be on its guard in public accountability of its budgetary and financial
operations so that it does not become a victim of Mr. Schopenhauser's epitaph. He went to visit the
gallery where the portraits ofbankers were hung, and observing their image exclaimed: when I look
at your faces, even in your graves, I have to admit that God is not with you.
ADDENDUM
NEW FOREX DECREE ERODES CBN'S AUTONOMY
had finished this paper when I read about the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring And
Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1995 in one of Nigeria's Dailies. THIS DAY of
September 1&2 1995, and I quote:
By the new Decree, The CBN, aside from seeking the approval of the Finance Minister to issue
guidelines to regulated procedures for transactions in the autonomous foreign exchange market,
could have some of its decision reverse by the Minister.
Section l , subsection 2 of the Decree states: Subject to this decree, the CBN may, with the
approval of the Minister, issue from time to time, guidelines to regulate the procedures for
transactions in the market and for such other matters as may be deemed appropriate for the effective
operations of the market.
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Section 8 (2) of the Decree also empowers the Minister to intervene. The Minister may from
time to time, issue such directives not inconsistent with this decree as to how he may deem
appropriate for the efficient operation of the market.
This same power is conferred on the Minister in Section 39 which states that he may by order
make such transitional provisions as appear to him necessary or expedient to give full effect to the
provisions of this decree.
Experts believe these provisions are ominous for the CBN. In addition to being at the mercy of
the Finance Minister in the efficient operations of the foreign exchange market, the Decree, in
Section 6, also denies the CBN the right of final decisions in the appointment of authorised dealers
or buyers in the market. Sub-section 2 states: A person aggrieved by the decision of the CBN under
sub-section ( l) of this section may within 28 days of the receipt by him of the letter of revocation,
appeal in writing to the Minister. Sub-section 3 states: The Minister may, after g iving
consideration to the circumstance of the case, reverse or affirm the decision of the Central Bank, as
the case may be.
The new Decree is not only ominous for the Central Bank of Nigeria, but extremely disastrous
for policy formulation. It is an action worse than inactivity. It is a political time bomb. It only takes
a self-seeking foreign exchange user to blackmail the Governor of the Central Bank before a.politically appointed Minister of Finance. The cost to the nation of this new Decree cannot be estimated
now. Foreign exchange operation is a sensitive, daily affair, where national and international
currencies are traded. To subject the foreign exchange market to suspense, wait-and-see manipulation is to render policy formulation meaningless. What I have even foretold earlier wiJI be a child's
play from what this new Decree has brought out. In this day and age when one can scarcely know
the difference between the civil servant on his desk and the portmantoe carrying business man-cum
Jankara market women in quest for money, the country is up for a rough-time in decision-making
on fiscal and monetary policies that are not'based on sound economic and financial policy formulation. It takes patriotism and professionalism to assemble data and analyze them in formulating
policy, and not mere guess work, a tragic effort of judgement to which we are returning through
buck-passing by those who will see the Central Bank now as a mere Department of the Federal
Ministry of Finance. The situation is particularly tragic against the background of our civil service
that is still administration oriented for a function that is developmental and business-like in this
stage of our economic growth and development where a great deal of stmctural adjustment is
required.

S. B. FALEGAN
12th September, 1995.

